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I should like to thank the editors of the Texas Law Review for making 
this colloquy possible.  Additionally, I should like to thank Professor Gary S. 
Lawson for writing (on short notice) a thorough and scholarly opposition, to 
which I reply below.  Although I do not shy away from any position taken in 
A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. 
Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly 
Reasoned,1 Professor Lawson is correct in one regard: nowhere do I clearly 
explain the boundaries or contours of the condition precedent interpretation 
of the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause (the “ORV Clause”) and its 
relation to the nondelegation doctrine.  Although the reader might believe 
this failure on my part was somehow obvious, it seemed at the time that it 
was enough to resurrect the forgotten original meaning of the ORV Clause 
without expressly addressing the interplay between that meaning and other 
(albeit related) doctrines and constitutional provisions.  Below I attempt to 
address Professor Lawson’s critique and to show that the breadth of 
Congress’s power under the ORV Clause is nearly coextensive with 
Congress’s statutory lawmaking powers. 
 
 * Harvard Law School, J.D., cum laude (2000); University of Chicago, A.B., honors (1984).  
Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia and the State of Illinois.  This Reply was written 
while clerking for the Honorable Jane R. Roth, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
(2004–2005).  Once again I find myself indebted to a number of individuals.  I should like to thank: 
M.N. Venkatachaliah, Chief Justice of India (ret.), for his comments regarding single-house action 
under Indian law; Gerard W. Hogan, Senior Counsel, and T. John O’Dowd, University College of 
Dublin Faculty of Law Academic and Barrister, for their comments regarding single-house action 
under Irish law; and David M. Driesen, Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, for 
his many helpful comments in earlier stages of this project.  Additionally, I solicited and received 
useful comments from Professors R. Kent Newmyer, Alison G. Olson, John Vile, Kurt Lash, 
Murray Dry, Herbert A. Johnson, George W. Carey, Clyde E. Jacobs, Charles F. Hobson, Forrest 
McDonald, M.J.C. Vile, George M. Curtis, Peter Bromhead, Brent Tarter, Library of Virginia, Sir 
William McKay, Ian Harris, Clerk of the House of Representatives, Parliament of Australia, David 
Moltke-Hansen, President, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, and Alan Simcock, Executive 
Secretary, OSPAR Commission with regard to my use of historical and parliamentary materials.  
Thank you, all.  Alas, all errors remain mine. 
1. Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 
83 TEXAS L. REV. 1265 (2005). 
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– I – 
Professor Lawson’s position, as I understand it, is that Congress cannot 
delegate lawmaking power.  Professor Lawson does not tell us what law-
making power is precisely.  But whatever it is or whatever it may have meant 
to the eighteenth century conventioneer, ratifier, jurist, or member of the 
educated public—that power has been placed in Congress by the Legislative 
Powers Vesting Clause, and that precludes lawmaking by a single house.  
Congress is restricted by the vesting clause of Article I to those acts that can 
be reasonably described as consistent with the eighteenth century view of the 
“legislative power.”2  Moreover, were one house to act alone, Professor 
Lawson argues, its actions must perforce trespass on powers that are better 
(or only) described as executive or judicial—equally forbidden per the vest-
ing clauses of Articles II and III.3  Having excluded the whole of lawmaking 
from the ambit of the ORV Clause, Professor Lawson concludes that the 
remaining domain of the ORV Clause must be congressional subpoenas.  The 
premise here is that the sort of discretion that judicial and executive actors 
regularly use in the performance of their duties must also be used by a single 
house operating (acting alone) under the aegis of the ORV Clause.  Because I 
disagree with this assumption, I also disagree with Professor Lawson’s 
ultimate conclusion restricting the domain of the Clause. 
Congress cannot order a federal court to rule for a particular party in a 
particular case.4  But until the last day passes for a nonprevailing party to 
 
2. Compare Gary Lawson, Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement 
for Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 
1373, 1378 [hereinafter Lawson, Burning Down the House] (focusing on the Executive Power and 
Judicial Power Vesting Clauses as textual sources inconsistent with single-house action), with Gary 
S. Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 337 (2002) (arguing that each 
of the three vesting clauses has operative force as a matter of original meaning).  In Burning Down 
the House, Professor Lawson primarily grounds his argument for restricting lawmaking per the 
ORV Clause in the vesting clauses of Articles II and III.  This is not surprising.  To the extent that 
lawmaking per the ORV Clause is just another method to legislate, it is embraced by the Vesting 
Clause of Article I in precisely the same way that the statutory lawmaking process is.  They are 
both, after all, components of Article I, Section 7.  Cf. Lawson, Burning Down the House, supra, at 
1383 (taking the position that the Legislative Powers Vesting Clause “vests in Congress a subset of 
all powers conceivably labeled ‘legislative’ that are enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution” but 
not explaining why lawmaking per delegated authority under the aegis of the ORV Clause is not one 
such enumerated power). 
3. See Lawson, Burning Down the House, supra note 2, at 1378; see also Michael B. 
Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the 
Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 
304 & n.135 (2001) (suggesting that the core of textual support for the nondelegation doctrine is in 
the Executive Power Vesting Clause, rather than the Necessary and Proper Clause or Legislative 
Powers Vesting Clause). 
4. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (refusing to give effect 
to a statute that “prescribe[d] [a] rule[] of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in 
cases pending before it”); see also United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 405 
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seek reconsideration or appeal, a judicial decision has not fully vested an 
individual right.5  Until the last moment has passed, Congress may create a 
new rule of decision for that case and for like cases—leaving the 
determination of the outcome under the new rule for the federal (and state) 
courts.6  Although not exactly the same, similar considerations apply with 
regard to Congress’s relationship to final determinations made by the 
Executive Branch.  For example, a party may take possession of land in a 
federal territory through a grant from the United States.  Once the last neces-
sary act under then-prevailing law is done and right to the land vests in the 
grantee, it is too late for Congress to act under the aegis of the Territory and 
other Property Clause—at least not without giving rise to a cause of action 
for a taking. 
On the other hand, prior to final action by the Executive Branch and 
prior to a final judgment (and the exhaustion of appellate review and 
reconsideration) by the Judicial Branch, Congress’s power to change the 
legal relations between parties (between private parties, or between parties 
 
(1980) (finding the constitutional infirmity in Klein rooted in the fact that the statute required 
judicial “‘decision of a cause in a particular way’”) (quoting Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146). 
5. Compare Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (holding that 
although Congress cannot direct findings under old law, Congress may amend applicable law even 
if it affects pending litigation, including affecting outstanding injunctions), with Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding that in situations involving cases that have gone to 
final judgment and concluded appellate review, Congress has no constitutional power to make new 
statutes giving relief to a party whose action had already been dismissed). 
6. My analysis here generally follows hornbook doctrine.  Any colloquy between Professor 
Lawson and myself requires our taking some areas of doctrine as noncontroverted.  Admittedly, I do 
not know Professor Lawson’s precise views on this particular area of law.  For example, in Burning 
Down the House, Professor Lawson wrote that in Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 382 (1813), the contested statute left it to the President to determine if England had 
ceased violating neutral United States commerce, and that Congress “could not . . . entrust that 
responsibility by statute to itself, one house, or a legislative committee.”  Lawson, Burning Down 
the House, supra note 2, at 1380 (emphasis added).  I readily agree that Congress could not entrust 
that power to itself—to the exclusion of the President.  Cf. id. at 1380 (“A legislative veto is a device 
whereby executive action implementing a statute is voided by [subsequent] legislative action—
whether by Congress, one house of Congress, or a congressional committee—which does not 
undergo presentment.”) (emphasis added).  ORV Clause lawmaking is, of course, distinguishable 
from the legislative veto mechanisms described by Professor Lawson.  All lawmaking, single-house 
or bicameral, pursuant to the ORV Clause must be presented. 
 Is there any reason to believe that Congress, at the time the events of the Brig Aurora unfolded, 
could not have altered the terms of its delegation to the Executive Branch by a later statute?  
Likewise, Congress might by statute have limited the legal effect of a prior exercise of presidential 
discretion to a specified time period—effectively requiring statutory ratification of the presidential 
finding.  In neither of the scenarios just described would Congress be “implementing federal law”—
to use Professor Lawson’s terminology.  Congress would simply be making new statutory law.  If 
such lawmaking by statute, terminating or effectively overriding Executive Branch discretion, 
passes constitutional muster and is not a forbidden use of executive or judicial discretion by 
Congress, then one house of Congress (subject to presentment) can also achieve the same result 
under delegated statutory authority, nondelegation concerns notwithstanding.  See infra note 7 
(discussing the nondelegation doctrine and enforcement of federal law). 
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vis-à-vis the United States) is largely unimpaired, notwithstanding a party’s 
upset expectations when “relying” on extant law and notwithstanding the 
unfairness of perceived retroactivity.  When Congress makes use of this 
undoubted plenary power (within those substantive areas of lawmaking 
constitutionally committed to Congress), what procedural mechanism does 
Congress use?  It acts by statute. 
Accepting this result has consequences for Professor Lawson’s position.  
It means that Congress’s power to upset (modify, terminate, or create ab 
initio) what would otherwise be the legal relations between parties is a valid, 
constitutional exercise of power, properly described as legislative in nature, 
and not a forbidden use of judicial or executive discretion.  This is then the 
answer to Professor Lawson’s query.  If and when Congress can validly con-
trol legal relations by statute, then it can also constitutionally achieve the 
same result acting under the aegis of the ORV Clause.7  ORV Clause 
lawmaking and traditional statutory lawmaking are merely alternative 
congressional instruments to achieve the same goal: legislation broadly 
understood.  If Congress’s use of discretion in enacting a statute is properly 
denominated as “legislative” in nature, then that use of discretion is not 
magically transformed into forbidden “executive” or “judicial” discretion 
when Congress adopts a different intracongressional procedure8 or statutory 
instrument achieving precisely the same end.9 
 
7. I see no cause for concern that operating under the aegis of the ORV Clause, Congress might 
usurp the Executive Branch’s role in law enforcement.  Congress and its officers cannot generally 
enforce federal statutory law against nonmembers and nonemployees, particularly beyond the 
bounds of the Capitol or when Congress is not in session.  Just as Congress cannot assign such 
responsibilities to itself or to its officers via statute, it cannot sidestep that result acting under the 
aegis of the ORV Clause or other delegated authority.  See supra note 6 (discussing the 
nondelegation doctrine and the implementation of federal law). 
8. My characterization of ORV Clause lawmaking as self-delegation or intracongressional 
delegation is no idle fancy.  Professor Lawson’s position relies on scholarship surrounding the 
nondelegation doctrine and case law going back to the Brig Aurora.  I believe such reliance is 
somewhat misplaced.  Such case law generally discusses the propriety of cross-branch delegations, 
i.e., the propriety of Congress’s delegating to the courts or to the executive.  ORV Clause 
lawmaking is more akin to waiver: Congress is delegating to one of its constituent components, not 
to a rival branch.  Separation of powers concerns here are misplaced.  I do acknowledge that my 
view is not universally shared.  See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 395 (1990) 
(“Provisions for the separation of powers within the Legislative Branch are thus not different in 
kind from provisions concerning relations between the branches; both sets of provisions safeguard 
liberty.”); id. at 394 (“What the Court has said of the allocation of powers among branches is no less 
true of such allocations within the Legislative Branch.”) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948–
51 (1983)).  Although the Supreme Court is a high authority whose opinions deserve our every 
consideration and respect, its modern opinions add little to a discussion regarding original meaning, 
understanding, purpose, or intent.  See, e.g., Tillman, supra note 1, at 1343 nn.167–68 (noting the 
Chadha Court’s inability to fathom either the elements of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137 (1803), or the Constitution’s technical use of the term “advice and consent” as opposed to 
“ratify” with regard to the treaty process). 
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Although Professor Lawson does not make this precise argument, some 
might take the position that Congress is only acting in a legislative capacity, 
consistent with the Legislative Powers Vesting Clause, when it writes 
statutes.  This opinion is, in fact, probably widely held. 
However, this view is somewhat problematic.  This position assumes an 
identity between legislation (per the Legislative Powers Vesting Clause) and 
statutes or statutory law (per Article I, Section 7, Clause 2).  First, the 
Constitution’s text does not support such an identity of meaning between the 
two terms.10  Indeed, the Supremacy Clause expressly includes nonstatutory 
forms of lawmaking—treaties (another form of single-house action subject to 
presidential ratification) and constitutional amendments—as the supreme law 
 
 I believe the same conclusions could be arrived at under the Rules of Proceedings Clause.  See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  There is now a wide body of persuasive scholarly literature arguing 
that each house of Congress has an independent power to delegate (its share of statutory) 
lawmaking to an internal supermajority or submajority.  For example, substantial scholarly 
authority has maintained that a Senate majority may, by single-house rule, delegate the Senate’s 
lawmaking powers to sixty members, fifty members, or to forty members . . . or to one member—as 
opposed to simple majority rule.  ORV Clause lawmaking is merely delegating to a zero 
submajority—with a concomitant waiver of Senate authentication.  See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 
392 n.4 (“[C]ourts accept as passed all bills authenticated in the manner provided by Congress.”). 
9. However, intraparliamentary delegation comes with not insubstantial costs.  Consider the 
example of the United Kingdom: There, single-house lawmaking per delegated authority is 
authorized under the Parliament Act of 1911.  This has led to supremacy conundrums.  See 
Parliament Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13 (U.K.) (limiting the House of Lords’s ability to delay a 
bill to a maximum of two years, after which the House of Commons could act without participation 
of the Lords—but the crown’s assent was still required), amended by, Parliament Act of 1949, 12, 
13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 103 (U.K.) (further limiting the House of Lords’s ability to delay passage of a 
bill: Lords could delay passage of a bill for no more than one year).  Compare Peter Oborne, The 
Dubious Means by which Labour Hopes to Ban Hunting by Christmas, THE SPECTATOR, June 26, 
2004, at 10 (“[S]erious legal opinion has always doubted the validity of that 1949 Act.  The problem 
is that the Atlee government used the 1911 Act itself to press through the 1949 measure.  Right 
from the very start Britain’s leading jurists pointed out that the 1911 Act—a piece of delegated 
legislation—did not permit the monarch and Commons acting alone to change its own terms [from 
the 1911 Act].”), and Francis Bennion, Lord Donaldson of Lymington and the Parliament Acts, 150 
NEW L.J. 1789, 1789 (2000) (“Lord Donaldson says doubts have been raised [about the 1949 Act] 
by . . . the constitutional lawyers Sir William Wade, Professor Zellick and [the late] Professor [O.] 
Hood Phillips.”), with The Queen on the Application of Jackson v. H.M. Attorney General, [2005] 
EWHC 94 (QBD (admin) 2005), 2005 WL 62254 (upholding application of the 1949 Act), aff’d 
[2005] EWCA CIV 126 (Eng. Ct. App.), 2005 WL 291000, appeal to the House of Lords filed. 
10. Indeed, modern usage recognizes the distinction between lawmaking and statutes.  See 
Motion for Leave to File Brief of American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, at 11, INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, and 80-2171) (“Used in one sense, law is the 
body of governmental prescriptions binding upon the public, including agency rules . . . .  Used in 
another sense, law connotes only those prescriptions that are the work of Congress . . . .”) 
(submitted by Professor Antonin Scalia et al.).  If Justice Scalia, or anyone else, wishes to identify 
statutes with orders, resolutions, and votes, he or they will now have to make an argument to that 
effect.  Compare State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. 76, 95 (1851) (adjudicating state analogue of the ORV 
Clause and holding that “[b]ills and resolutions are named in contradistinction; both do not mean 
one and the same thing; if they do, unnecessary terms are made use of in the Constitution”), with 
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 87 (1900) (noting “elementary canon of construction which 
requires that effect be given to each word of the Constitution”). 
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of the land.  This indicates that things other than statutes are law, even if not 
statutory law.  All these instruments—constitutional amendments, statutes, 
and treaties—are equally legislation.  And it is no surprise that ORV Clause 
lawmaking is not included in the Supremacy Clause.  ORV Clause 
lawmaking is lawmaking per delegated authority—it can never be supreme 
relative to its authorizing or ratifying statute.  Second, views 
contemporaneous with ratification do not support an identity between 
legislation and statutory lawmaking.11  Third, history does not support 
identifying legislation with statutory lawmaking: pre-1787 British and 
American parliaments and legislatures availed themselves of a variety of 
alternative statutory instruments.12  Lastly, the structure of Article I, 
Section 7 is some support for the position that both procedures—statutory 
lawmaking, and ORV Clause lawmaking—are both valid expressions of 
Congress’s legislative power.  Article I, Section 8 lays out the broad heads of 
substantive congressional jurisdiction.  Article I, Section 7 lays out the 
procedures under which Congress may exercise power in the areas 
committed to its jurisdiction.  The only procedural restriction in Section 7 
restricts the statutory lawmaking process: the first clause requires that bills 
for raising revenue originate in the House.13  There are no similar Section 7 
procedural restrictions limiting the scope of ORV Clause lawmaking.  
(However, as explained in A Textualist Defense, many—but not all—of the 
Article I heads of substantive congressional jurisdiction preclude ORV 
Clause lawmaking by expressly limiting congressional power to statutory 
 
11. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 381 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“Law is defined to be a rule of action . . . .”), and WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTION 153–54 (R. H. S. Crossman intro., 1963) (1867) (“An immense mass, indeed, of the 
legislation is not, in the proper language of jurisprudence, legislation at all.  A law is a general 
command applicable to many cases.  The ‘special acts’ . . . are applicable to one case only.”) 
(emphasis added), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (“What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of making LAWS?”). 
12. See The Statute of Proclamations, 1539, 31 Hen. 8, ch. 8 (Eng.) (directing that the King’s 
proclamations were to be “obeyed, observed and kept as thoughe they were made by Acte of 
Parliament”); SIR WM. GRAHAM-HARRISON, NOTES ON THE DELEGATION BY PARLIAMENT OF 
LEGISLATIVE POWERS, WITH A PARTICULAR EXAMINATION OF THE CASE OF THE INSTITUTE OF 
PATENT AGENTS V. LOCKWOOD, AND SOME CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE 
GRANTING, EXERCISE AND CONTROL OF SUCH POWERS 4 (1931) (“[T]he legislative power won for 
the Parliament from the King was used to authorize the King to legislate without a Parliament.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Tillman, supra note 1, at 1310–11 n.100 (discussing British lawmaking 
by order and ordinance); id. at 1324–26 n.125 (discussing British lawmaking by single-house order, 
resolution or vote for the purpose of expenditure or taxation ratified by subsequent statute); id. at 
1326–27 n.126, 1335 n.146 (noting lawmaking by American colonies by single-house order, 
resolution or vote, particularly in the financial context); cf. id. at 1357–63 nn.203–23 (citing the 
celebrated Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782), which held that the newly independent 
state of Virginia may issue a legislative pardon, although expressing disagreement as to whether it 
extended to a single-house pardon). 
13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
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lawmaking.14)  The placement of procedural restrictions on the statutory law-
making procedure within Section 7, but the absence of any coordinate 
procedural restrictions on the ORV Clause, is some additional reason to 
believe that Congress’s power to act under the ORV Clause is generally 
coextensive with its power to act by statute. 
Of course, it must be remembered that ORV Clause lawmaking is 
delegated authority.  Congress can only delegate what it has.15  If Congress 
could not achieve a result by statutory lawmaking, it cannot achieve it 
indirectly by a prior statute and a later-in-time order.  Similarly, if the Bill of 
Rights precludes certain congressional actions, just as Congress cannot 
trespass on those rights by statute, it cannot do so indirectly by order, 
resolution or vote. 
Let’s recapitulate these results.  When may Congress engage in law-
making under the aegis of the ORV Clause?  The first question to ask is 
whether or not Congress could act by statute to achieve the same result.  If 
not, then Congress cannot act under the aegis of the ORV Clause.  If so, then 
the second question to ask is whether or not Congress’s power to legislate per 
single-house action has been precluded by a constitutional provision 
demanding congressional action “by law.”16  If so, then ORV Clause 
lawmaking is precluded.  Otherwise, Congress has plenary power to act via 
statute or under the aegis of the ORV Clause. 
Congressional action pursuant to the ORV Clause is amenable to 
adjudication testing to see whether the single-house order is ultra vires under 
the terms of its organic act. 
– II – 
What about legislative vetoes?  Aren’t legislative vetoes in their very 
nature or essence a use of discretion that can only be categorized as judicial 
or executive and hence forbidden under the aegis of the ORV Clause because 
they are not properly legislative in character? 
Consider Chadha.  Congress provided by statute that the Attorney 
General’s use of discretion—overturning the immigration judge’s decision to 
deport—was not final until the end of Congress’s next session.  Does anyone 
 
14. See Tillman, supra note 1, at 1328–29 & n.129. 
15. In correspondence with Professor Lawson, I had previously expressed a different position: 
“I believe that anything that Congress might delegate to the President (or the Executive Branch 
generally), Congress might alternatively or additionally delegate to a single-house with 
presentment . . . .”  Letter from Seth Barrett Tillman to Gary S. Lawson, Professor of Law, Boston 
University School of Law 1 (Apr. 9, 2004) (on file with the Texas Law Review).  Professor 
Lawson’s comment and subsequent correspondence have convinced me that my initial views were 
incorrect. 
16. See supra note 14. 
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doubt that during that period of time, Congress—by means of a suitably 
general statute—might have (effectively) overridden the decision of the 
Executive Branch?  I suppose some might doubt the validity of such a 
statute.  Such a position is at odds with settled law, but it is not a wholly 
frivolous position.  A person taking such a point of view would preclude 
even statutes from functioning as legislative vetoes.17  And if such statutes 
are precluded, then Congress cannot achieve a functional legislative veto 
under the aegis of the ORV Clause. 
On the other hand, if Congress could constitutionally override the 
Attorney General, by a suitably general statute, then it could with equal 
propriety embody the terms of that statute in the form of a single-house 
order, assuming presentment of the order and an authorizing or ratifying 
statute.  Again, the test is simple: If Congress can validly achieve its goal by 
statute, then the same action is equally permissible under the aegis of the 
ORV Clause, absent a constitutional provision mandating congressional 
action “by law.” 
The constitutional problem for such legislation, legislation effectively 
overriding judicial or executive branch determinations absent (fully) vested 
rights, to the extent that a problem exists, is not in the procedural form such 
legislation takes, but in the substance—the terms of the override.  Is the over-
ride suitably general and prospective, operating on cases yet unknown (in 
addition to the known case stimulating congressional action)?  Does it look 
like a rule governing primary nonlitigation future activity?  Or is the 
legislation specific, temporary in operation, or effectively retrospective 
because it reaches only a particular party—expressly named or implicitly 
described?  In other words, is it attainder-like?  Has Congress commanded 
the courts to rule for a particular party in a particular cause in a pending 
case?  Is it the Klein problem?  Here I need only note that any such defect 
would equally implicate a statute and a congressional order under delegated 
statutory authority.  If the Vesting Clauses of the Constitution exclude from 
the domain of the ORV Clause some or all legislative vetoes (even subject to 
presentment), then it is only because statutes are similarly limited.  Likewise, 
the domain of the ORV Clause might also be limited by the nondelegation 
doctrine.  If it is, it is limited in precisely the same way that statutes 
achieving the same ends are limited. 
 
17. See, e.g., Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Requiring Renomination and 
Reconfirmation of Executive Branch Officers upon the Expiration of a Presidential Term, 11 
OPINIONS OFF. LEGAL COUNS. U.S. DEP’T JUST. 25, 26 (1987) (taking the position that “the 
exclusivity of the President’s removal power cannot be circumvented . . . by ‘ripper’ legislation 
which purports to abolish an office and immediately recreate it” although acknowledging that bona 
fide abolition of an office is possible). 
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The ORV Clause tells us nothing with regard to the validity of the 
nondelegation doctrine as a matter of original meaning circa 1787.  Nor does 
the ORV Clause teach us anything with regard to the precise contours that 
doctrine imposes on statutes or on alternative statutory instruments.  What 
does the ORV Clause teach us?  Only this: Congress may create legal 
instruments other than statutes, equally demanding recognition from the 
public and from the other branches.  That is all.  And to the extent that the 
Bill of Rights, the nondelegation doctrine, or other constitutional doctrines or 
provisions restrict the constitutional domain of statutes, those doctrines and 
provisions apply with equal (if not greater) force against alternative statutory 
instruments passed per delegated statutory authority. 
